Britain, The European Community and South Africa: European Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting September 10. British Information Services No. 26/85, 13 September 1985 by unknown
--·· 
BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES 
September 13, 1985 POLICY STATEMENTS 
26/85. BRITAIN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND SOUTH AFRICA: EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL cooPERATION MINISTERIAL Mf!t!NG SEPTEM!E!·IO 
The Ministers of the Ten, S¥~!n and 
Portugal heard'the re~ort o the 
European Mfs.sion whic visited South 
Africa from August 30 to September 
I, 1985: 
The European delegation met with members of the South African 
Government, representatives of the churches and trade unions, leading 
businessmen, journalists and leaders of the Progressive Feder~l Party 
(PEP) Inkatha and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO). To 
supplement these contacts, on September 10 the President-in-Offi.ce of 
the Council of Minlsters and the member of the Commiss-ion re8popsible 
for external r·elations met representatives of the Afri'can NatlOifilt. 
Congress. The conclusions which emerged from the visit of the FGreign 
Ministers and the ministerial discussions can be summarized in two 
points. 
"The Ten, together with Spain and Portugal, take 
note of the declaration of the South African 
Government and expect of it that it take specific 
step~. 
"Meanwhile they will maintain their pressure on 
South Africa. 
"The Ten and Spain and Portugal have decided to 
harmonize their attitudes on the following measures: 
Restrictive Measures 
A rigorously controlled embargo on exports 
of arms and paramilitary equipment to the RSA. 
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A rigorously controlled embargo on imports 
of arms and paramilitary equipment from the 
RSA. 
Refusal to cooperate in the military sphere. 
~ Recall of military attaches accredited to 
the RSA, and refusal to grant accreditation 
to military attaches from the RSA. 
Discouraging cultural and scientific agree-
ments except where these contribute towards 
the ending of apartheid or have no possible 
role in supporting it: and freezing of 
official contacts and international agree-
ments in the sporting and security spheres. 
Cessation of oil exports to the RSA. 
Cessation of exports of sensitive equipment 
destined for the police and armed forces 
of the RSA. 
Prohibition of all new collaboration in the 
nuclear sector. 
·Pos'itive Measures 
Code of conduct·: Adaptation, reinforcement 
and publicity. 
Programs of assistance to non-violent anti-
apartheid organizations, particularly to the 
churches. 
Programs to assist the education of the non-
white community, including grants for study 
at the universities in the countries originat-
ing the programs. 
Intensification of contacts with the non-white 
community in the political, trade union, 
business, cultural, scientific and sporting 
sectors, etc. 
Programs to assist the SADCC and the front-
line states. 
Programs to increase awareness among the 
citizens of member states resident in the RSA. 
The British Government w~s able to support the general statement 
and t~e positive measures, but wished to give further ccnsideration 
to the other measures proposed. 
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In speaking to the press after the Ministerial meeting, Mr 
Malcolm Rifkind, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office made five main points: 
(1) "All member states had a common aim of seeing 
the end of apartheid and full political rig·hts 
for all South Africans. 
(2) "The meeting had not been a failure. All member 
states had agreed the political statement and 
the list of positive measures to help the Bl_acks 
in South Africa. The U.K. had reserved its 
position on the list of restrictive measures so 
that the implications could be fully considered. 
Detailed texts, some of which had been drafted 
only today, could not be agreed blind. After 
all it had taken the U.S. a month to put to-
gether the list of measures recently announced. 
We did not oppose the position taken by others. 
(3) "The U.K. had for historic reasons a greater 
involvement than other member states in South 
Africa. Because of this, the measures proposed 
raised wider issues for the U.K. than for some 
others. 
(4) ."Many of the proposed restrictive measures had 
already been implemented by the U.K. (arms 
e-mgargo, etc) but some were new, e.g. ban on 
cultural ~ooperation. The U.K. would need to 
consider whether this would have any implica-
tions for the excellent work being done within 
South Africa by the British Council to promote 
cultural values fundamentally opposed to the 
apartheid system. 
(5) "Equally the proposed withdrawal of military 
attaches, opposed by U.K. and Portugal (2 of 
the 3 E.C. countries to have attaches in South 
Africa) raised the question whether it was 
advisable to reduce knowledge of, and influence 
on one of the most powerful bodies in South Africa." 
Mr.Rifkind repudiated the suggestion that Britain's action 
showed that she was friendly towards the Botha Government and urged 
that British views on economic sanctions were shared by many prominent 
Black and White opponents of the South African regime. Indeed the 
U,K. Government was often attacked by the South African Government for 
acting in an unfriendly way. 
The British Government needed more time to consider the impact 
of the .restrictive measures now proposed and to consider whether they 
would help to achieve the objectives which all shared. It was important 
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to encourage the South African Government down the path we wanted them 
to follow. Measures which drove the White community back into a 
laager would be counter-productive. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth S~cretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
reinforced these points in a press conference in Lagos, Nigeria on 
September 12. He was asked why B~itain had refused to endorse 
European Community measures to be taken against South Africa? 
RRpp 
The Foreign Secretary replied: 
"Let me make it clear there was no disagreement 
between Britain and our European partners yesterday 
in the view which we took of the situation in South 
Africa. We took exactly the same view of what needs 
to be done iQ South Afric4, th~ need as I said for 
bringing apartheid to an end and the need for commence-
ment of·genuine dialogue betw~en the Government there 
and representatives ofthe Black population .. The 
difference was in respect of measures, the restrictive 
measures recommended yesterday for we think it is 
necessary to have more time to consider some of them. 
This is not surprising because the nature of the 
relationships between each European country and South 
Africa is diff~rent. Hi~torically Britain has a much 
longer relationship with South Africa than any other 
and there are many more contacts with the South African 
people living in that country. It is very important 
for us to give proper con~ideration to the restrictive 
measures being used to ensure that they are in accord-
ance with our view. Will these measures mo~t effectively 
through the pressurF of Britain bringing its influence 
to bear bring about the change we want in South Africa." 
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